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1  Introduction 
Savings and saving rates are a key element for the analysis of household behavior. They 
present the foundation for many different research areas, as e.g., how well households are pre-
pared for old-age (the old-age provision motive), what measures they take to insure against 
unknown shocks (the precautionary motive), how important consumption smoothing is (the 
intertemporal substitution motive), among many others, which already have been almost 
completely by Keynes (1936), to which Browning and Lusardi (1996) added the downpayment 
motive to complete the list. 
For an empirical analysis, micro data on households (or individuals) are needed to get an 
insight into peoples' actual behavior. The crucial variable is a precise assessment of house-
holds' savings. This sounds a lot easier than it can actually be implemented in a survey not 
only collecting savings and income, but also many additional variables inevitable for a broad 
behavioristic analysis.
1 
This paper goes to the very roots of respondents' understanding of savings. Do they realize 
savings just as the residual leftovers on their accounts after subtracting all monthly expendi-
tures from all monthly net income flows? If so, then savings will heavily be underestimated. 
E.g., credit repayments in that sense would be expenditures but clearly are a savings compo-
nent
2. The same applies for monthly contributions to private savings and pension plans, whole 
life insurances or building society contracts, which might be perceived as an additional income 
tax even though these are discretionary contributions to build up private wealth. Even more 
complicated to assess are employers' contributions to occupational pension schemes since these 
contracts normally only tell the employee the future benefits of this kind of pension scheme. 
Four kinds of measures for household savings are typically calculated. The first one is the 
first difference in net wealth since all savings have to be allocated to any form of financial or real 
investment. Not looking at the stock of wealth but at the contributions and withdrawals gives 
the second measure for savings (flow measure). The third one is the residual, or epsilon meas-
ure of savings which subtracts all expenditures
3 from all compositions of net income
4. Concern-
ing these measures, one has to be aware of the symmetry of positive and negative values, and to 
                                                       
1 To visualize the complexity of a simple savings question, just ask yourself:  "How much, on average, do I save per 
month?' 
2 Even though, loan and mortgage repayments have been incorrectly included in the one-shot question on total non-
durable expenditures in the Canadian Out of Employment Panel (COEP), see Browning and Crossley (2002). 
3 Expenditures then are typically defined as total non-durable expenditures, excluding contributions to any saving ac-
counts.   2
adjust flow and stock measures. This is the subject of Börsch-Supan et al. (1999)'s work. See 
also Brugiavini and Weber (2003) for a discussion on these saving concepts. The fourth one 
is to directly include a question on household savings in the questionnaire, leaving it to the re-
spondents to deliver a reasonable assessment of private savings. 
Much research has been done for almost all of the above mentioned savings motives, but 
they are far from being consistent even within a research area restricted to only one of the 
topics. Apart from differences in the econometric assessment of the topics and variations in 
their specifications, the data base used is frequently different. But not only the data base itself, 
also the dependent variable used differs. From which of the four measures are savings calculated 
from? In a very recent study, Alessie et al. (2004) compare savings and saving rates for the Ital-
ian Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) and the Dutch Socio-Economic Panel 
(SEP) using different saving concepts. For the flow measure, they compute the saving rate as 
(Y-C)/C- where Y is the sum of personal incomes of parents and child, and C is non-durable 
consumption. The procedure to the saving rate relative to consumption instead of income was 
proposed by Attanasio (1998) to avoid the problems of outliers and zero income observations. 
Alessie et al. (2004) also implicitly equal consumption and expenditures. This might sound tau-
tological, but as Aguiar and Hurst (2004) very recently pointed out, the dramatic decline in 
expenditures at the time of retirement is matched by an equally dramatic rise in time spent on 
home production. This argument goes back to Becker (1986), who states that consumption is 
the output of a "home production" function that uses both expenditure and time as inputs. 
The innovation of that paper is that the authors empirically disentangle changes in actual con-
sumption from changes in expenditures. Taken together, the results highlight how direct meas-
ures of consumption distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated shocks to income, while 
using expenditure alone obscures this difference and leads to false rejections of the PIH. 
This paper presents concisely the main findings for savings and saving rates estimated with 
the SAVE survey. Section 2 quickly summarizes the definition of savings and shows which of 
the four saving measures can be computed with SAVE, while Section 3 concentrates on the 
assessment and measurement of the one-shot savings question in SAVE. Section 4 discusses 
the results from different correction measures for the one-shot savings question, and Section 5 
summarizes this paper's issues. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
4 Income is the sum of all different income components, like wage and capital income, transfer income, and social secu-
rity benefits.   3
2  Saving measures in SAVE 
The SAVE survey bears the possibility to calculate savings in three of the four ways de-
scribed in Section 1. The first one is the first difference in financial wealth components, 
while the second one would be the epsilon measure of savings as the difference between all 
components of household income and total non-durable expenditures, which are asked in SAVE. 
The third one is a one-shot saving question asking for total savings a household achieved in the 
last year, without explicitly guiding the respondent by using a comprehensive list of components 
which typically should be accounted for. 
This section quickly depicts and explains potential problems for each these three savings 
measures. 
2.1  First difference in wealth 
Financial wealth is asked for the beginning and the end of the calendar year previous to the 
survey field time. A savings measure often found in the empirical literature on savings and sav-
ings behavior is to calculate savings as the difference between financial wealth at the end and 
the beginning of the preceding year. Ignoring changes in the credit situation or real wealth allo-
cation, including homes, this shows even conceptually a massive flaw. Any reallocations from 
real to financial wealth or the other way around would be registered as savings/dissavings, even 
though this is clearly without effect on the total wealth situation. The same is true for short sell-
ing, or credit financed investments. Other problems are of empirical nature. Values for the total 
amount in certain wealth categories like saving accounts, stock, or mutual funds, certainly are 
as much due to recall error as the one-shot savings or expenditure questions. Additionally, it is 
impossible to distinguish between 'active' and 'passive' savings (putting money into that finan-
cial wealth category, or does market appreciation/depreciation account for higher/lower values 
at the end of the year?). 
2.2  Residual measure 
A third savings measure would be to compute savings as the residual measure (difference 
between savings and expenditures). This savings measure requires two variables to be reliable. 
The first one is income; see Essig (2005) for a discussion on income values in SAVE . 
The other variable, expenditures, has been proven to be a rather imprecise measure for 
households' expenditures, cf. Browning et al. (2003) or Winter (2004). Knowing these results 
before including the expenditure questions, there were also four sub-items included from which 
is known that they are typically remembered very well; based on these sub-items, Browning   4
et al. (2003) proposed a method to impute total non-durable expenditures in a way to fitting 
factual values much better than the one-shot question's values. This is done by Essig (2004) 
for the SAVE data using the EVS 1998 as an external data source. 
Even if expenditures were assessed correctly by this procedure, there is still a conceptual 
problem. Durable consumption goods are difficult to assess. First of all, there are no data on 
durables in SAVE. Second, durables affect savings not by the time they are purchased, since 
they represent at that time wealth in equal size, neglecting transaction costs. More relevant is 
the useful economic life to calculate the depreciation rate, which about represents the periodical 
consumption value. But these data are extremely difficult to assess, for which not even diary-
based consumption and expenditure data are a reliable data source. 
2.3  One-shot saving questions 
The SAVE questionnaire also contains a direct one-shot question to yearly savings. This 
might well be subject to the same problems being discussed in the context of the one-shot ex-
penditure question. 
The following section will explain more deeply the possible problems and correction methods 
for this one-shot savings questions. 
3  Reliability of one-shot savings measure 
This section argues that filtering might cause an underestimation of savings, and discusses 
the treatment of credit repayments, contributions for life insurances and different pension plans. 
I will also compare the values to the official numbers from the German Federal Reserve bank. 
3.1  Problems due to filtering 
The direct question for total last year's savings in SAVE follows a set of preliminary ques-
tions. These include who in the household actually makes the financial decisions, whether re-
spondents talk with other persons inside/outside the household about financial concerns, and 
who files for the income tax declaration. Next, respondents were asked about the reception of 
one-off payments like inheritances, tax refunds etc. as well as about the allocation of these 
one-off incomes. Questions checking whether the household pursuits a certain savings goal 
and by what time that goal shall be reached follow. In addition, a 'meet-ends' question is in-
cluded as well as a filter question for a self-assessment of actual savings behavior
5. The one-shot 
                                                       
5 'I/we save a fixed amount regularly,', 'I/we put something aside each month but I/we decide on the amount according to 
the financial circumstances', 'I/we put something aside when we have something left over to save', 'I/we do not save be-
cause we do not have enough scope financially to do so', '/we do not save because we would prefer to enjoy life now'.   5
question was asked as: 'And finally: Could you tell us how much money you and your partner 
together have saved in the year 2000?', only for respondents who did not choose the fourth or 
fifth item of the filter question
6 and did not refuse to answer to the filter question. 
Table 1: Origin of nonpositive numbers for one-shot savings question 
TPI 2001      CAPI 2001      CAPI 2003      RR 2003      TPI 2004   
N  660 1169 486 2184  483
obs. lost due to filterin  11.2%  17.0%  18.4%  24.2%  17.0% 
ref. in filter  1.4%  0.6%  0.6%  0.6%  1.0% 
# HH for one-shot savings question  586  970  396  1655  401 
does not apply / did save nothing  20.3%  21.2%  20.3%  19.5%  22.0% 
refusals  4.3%  17.2%  18.5%  15.5%  3.2% 
positive values for savings  442  597  241  1076  301 
imputed zero saving values           
in % of all obs. for savings  29.4%  40.0%  40.8%  43.6%  34.5% 
Source: All SAVE subsamples. 
Table 1 shows the different stages which lead to zero values of savings (be these zeros cor-
rect or incorrect). Due to filtering, 19.5% of all respondents were not asked for their savings. 
To see what the filtering implies for the resulting data, I apply the statistical error types 
I (rejecting a true hypothesis) and II (not rejecting a false hypothesis) to the filtering process. 
Filtering bears the chances of a type-II error (household does not save, but should do so accord-
ing to the filter process; this is depicted in Table 2) as well as of a type-I error (household saves 
but was cancelled out in the filtering process). The type-I error will lead to an underestimation 
of savings and saving rates since for these households zero savings are assumed. 
Table 2: Display of the type-II error 
 
  TPI 2001  CAPI 2001  CAPI 2003  RR 2003  TPI 2004 
regular savings           
N  391  417  186  769  249 
% of zeros in savings question  14.3%  10.1%  9.1%  10.9%  16.1% 
% refusals  4.1%  18.7%  21.5%  14.3%  3.6% 
flexible savings           
N  57  277  110  437  52 
% of zeros in savings question  14.0%  14.1%  16.4%  14.7%  19.2% 
% refusals  3.5%  19.9%  20.9%  19.2%  3.9% 
saves occasionally           
N  89  276  98  449  84 
% of zeros in savings question  53.9%  45.3%  45.9%  38.8%  39.3% 
% refusals  5.6%  12.3%  10.2%  14.0%  2.4% 
                                                       
6 "can't save / don't want to save".   6
Source: All SAVE subsamples. 
Notes: The share of zero values should be rather low for the first two categories. The difference of the 
shares is very small for the filter-categories "saves regularly a fixed amount" and "saves flexibly". For the 
third filter category "saves occasionally", the share of zeros is very high (43.5%). 
 
Households claiming not being able (or willing) to save show the following pattern which 
is depicted in Figure 2. The dependent variable refers to the filter question and takes on the 
value 1 if the respondent answered not being able / willing to save and 0 otherwise. 
Significant variables which raise the probability for not being able/willing to save are dum-
mies for: retirement; unemployment and partial unemployment; whether the respondent is par-
tially, little ('geringfügig'), or not employed; separated/divorced; and a dummy for credit re-
payments. Negative significant dummy variables are: self-employed; females; households living 
in Eastern Germany; and dummy variables for the ownership of financial wealth categories all 
financial wealth categories except bonds. Second-order polynomials for income and age are also 
negative significant, but not depicted in Figure 2. 
Insignificant variables, which are not depicted in Figure 2 are: dummies for schooling; 
dummies for the job type except self-employed; dummy variables for kids and kids living in the 
same house; a partner dummy; and dummies for the different SAVE subsamples. 
An important insight from the analysis of the savings ability is that households might not 
consider credit repayments being savings. This is shown by the positively significant coeffi-
cient of credit repayments (since the dependent variable takes on the value one if not being 
able /willing to save). Not adding credit repayments to savings therefore would lead to an un-
derestimation of savings. 
When looking at the values given for the one-shot savings question, one can see that about 
one fifth of respondents answered to having zero savings or below
7, further 13% refused to give 
values. In the following analyses for zero values and refusals will be separated. 
Figure 3 shows marginal effects of different significant regressors for the probability to 
give zero values. Next to the results in Figure 2, one can see that values for savings ability 
are consistent with the probability to give zero values: households saving regularly a fixed 
amount answered significantly less frequently with zero values than households who save only 
occasionally. While credit uptakes influence saving measures consistently, credit repayments 
are not understood as savings (as shown before); again, the coefficient is positive significant. 
The corresponding analysis of refusals for saving values will only be mentioned here. Only 
four variables from the set of 39 explanatory variables were significant: unemployed, occasional   7
savers, households from the two TPI subsamples and households with credit repayments have 
a lower probability to refuse the answer. For occasional savers and credit repayers this can be 
explained by the fact that these types have a higher probability of answering with zero values.
8 
Income, age, schooling, and job variables have no influence on refusals. 
Looking at the values from the one-shot saving question, one can observe in 27 cases saving 
rates which exceed net monthly income when savings is recalculated for a mensual measure.
9 
For three of these 27 cases high savings can be explained by high one-off income sources.
10 For 
the remaining 24 cases, saving rates are up to 1100% what in turn can heavily affect means. 
Four reasons for these values can be thought of. (1) Respondents gave wrong numbers which 
were recorded "correctly" (in CAPI interviews). (2) Respondents gave correct numbers which 
were recorded incorrectly (in CAPI interviews). (3) Respondents thought of the correct values 
but gave wrong numbers concerning one or two decimal places; these values were then recorded 
"correctly" (in CAPI interviews). (4) Respondents thought of and registered correct values 
which were then incorrectly scanned and transferred to computer data by the survey agency 
(in P&P interviews). There is a fifth possibility, which also occurred with the data at hand, but 
was recognized by the author and corrected accordingly by the survey agency: variables can be 
coded incorrectly, which gives implausible values for any observation or no variation between 
observations. This is the most unproblematic case. 
The 24 implausible cases distribute to the modes P&P with 10 cases (1.4%) and CAPI with 
14 cases (0.8%). There are two ways of dealing with these 24 cases. First, all of these cases 
can be coded as missings. Second, if it is believed that errors in the transmission process are re-
sponsible for the high savings / saving rates and if the error lies in the imprecision of one deci-
mal place, savings can be divided by 10. The latter way was applied here. 
3.2  Perception of savings 
Figure 1 might be helpful to illustrate the challenge of precisely measuring savings. A 
household is planning the acquisition of a consumption good which, since depicted as a dura-
ble good, he will consume for a certain time period. This acquisition can be financed in two 
ways. First, he can take up a credit (Figure 1, left hand side), or he can save the financial 
means needed (Figure 1, right hand side). When only looking at the latter case, one would ne-
                                                                                                                                                                                
7 Cf. Table 1. Negative savings are censored to zero due to the question ("did not save / have dipped into savings"). 
8 Running a multinomial logit regression with the three choices "Positive values", "zero/negative savings", "refusal", the 
results are in line with the findings from the binary model. 


























glect households with a higher time preference who prefer to consume now rather than after the 
saving period. Credit repayments thus are savings as well as the accumulation of assets. 
3.2.1  Credit repayments 
Credit repayments only compare to savings if they are not produced by wealth reallocations. 
Balance sheets would be shortened if credits were repaid through the liquidation of wealth. 
This is why I only add credit repayments to savings if they do not exceed 50% of net income.
11 If 
zero saving values were given, savings just equal credit repayments. This procedure is costly in 
the sense of data loss due to consistency reasons if observations are dropped if values for sav-
ings or credit repayments were refused. 
Figure 1: Financing a consumption good 
 
 
Notes: The depicted consumption good is a durable; its consumption period about equals the depreciation 
period. If consumption is immediate (voyages, dinners etc.) the consumption period reduces to 0, such 
that the downward sloping line of the consumption period would become a vertical line. The value of the 
credit is larger than the value of the consumption good if interest rates are positive, as depicted. 
 
At the same time, credit uptakes as such would typically not affect savings, as in most 
cases the uptaking of a credit would be related to the acquisition of a durable good of similar 
size (equal size + interest rate markup + adminstration fees). This would result in a 'longer bal-
ance' since the liquidity inflow faces an expenditure position (capital asset) of equal size (e.g. du-
rable consumption goods like furniture, cars, technical equipment etc.; housing). Credit up-
takes therefore will not be subtracted from savings; only repayments will be added.
12 In total, 
32% of respondents declared to repay credits, and 5% to have new credits taken up. 64% of all 
homeowners are indebted, and 38% of tenants. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
10 SAVE asks for one-off payments like inheritances, lottery gains, or tax refunds. 78% of all surveyed households de-
clared not having received any one-off income sources; the most common income source of the group which received 
any or several one-off payments tax refunds was the most common case. 
11 This rather high share of net income can be reasonable since high debit interest rates might force households to quick 
repayment. 
12 There is no way in the data to tell whether the credit uptake is used to finance a durable or non-durable consumption 
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3.2.2  Contributions to life insurance 
Having controlled for credit repayments, it is still unclear what exactly households have in 
mind when thinking about savings. Is it the sum which remains on the account at the end of 
the month (the balance of labor, capital and transfer income and total expenditures)? This cer-
tainly would underestimate savings, since it neglects credit repayments, as argued. Additionally, 
other expenditures are not completely consumption expenditures. Regular contributions to 
certain capital investments (whole life insurances, saving plans, building society contracts) 
could well be perceived as additional taxes on income. Heckman selection regressions for 
gross saving rates
13 on an income and age polynomial and a set of household and individual 
characteristics and a set of dummy variables for the ownership of each financial wealth category 
and for credit repayment show that five of the six financial wealth dummies are positively sig-
nificant except for whole life insurances. This might be an evidence that contributions to whole 
life insurances are possible not included in respondents' saving values. This section will ex-
plain how this can be remedied. 
Whole life insurance represents the Germans' most important instrument of private old-age 
provision, cf. Walliser and Winter (1999). 52% of all male respondents answered to own a life 
insurance contract as well as 34% of all respondents (weighted; unweighted: 38%). This share 
is below the values observed in the EVS 2003 where the share for all respondents is at 46%. 
The ownership of life insurance contracts strongly differs between the SAVE subsamples. 
Table 3: Life insurances: ownership rates 
   TPI 2001  TPI 2004  CAPI 2001  CAPI 2003  RR 2003  all 
Ownership  rates  50.6% 27.5% 39.2% 32.4% 26.4%  33.5% 
Panel comparison  ↔  ↔    
only in 2001 / withdr.  33.1%  17.2%     
neither in 2001 nor in 2003/2004  40.3%  52.4%     
in both 2001 and 2003/2004  22.5%  24.5%     
only in 2003/2004 / new contr.  4.1%  6.0%       
Source: All SAVE subsamples. 
Note: Weighted values. 
 
Table 3 shows the differences in ownership rates between the subsamples. It should be 
taken into account that the first line only shows values for the whole subsample; thus the ob-
servation that ownership rates dropped between 2001 and 2004 in the TPI subsamples by 23% is 
not valid. This is shown in the panel comparison where, of course, only values are shown for 
households being observed in both years. For these households, some differences occurred be-
tween 2001 and 2004: 33% claimed to having owned life insurances only in the first year, 
                                                       
13 The original values given to the one-shot question.   10
only 4% in the year 2004 if they had none in 2001. 
The decline in life insurance ownership has also been documented by Braun et al. (2002), 
Figure 22b, with values measured with the EVS, but the 2003 wave reports even lower val-
ues than predicted by Braun et al. (2002) (52% predicted for 2003, 45% reported in the EVS 
2003
14). Similar results are reported by the Gesamtverband der deutschen Versicherungswirt-
schaft (GDV) (2003). For the past year, trends for life insurances are summarized as follows: (1) 
significant growth of contributions for new contracts where one-off payments grew higher than 
the regular contributions; (2) significant reduction of new contracts; (3) growth of new contri-
butions, and (4) growing contract payments (Leistungsausahlungen). 
Contributions for life insurance contracts are normally paid on a regular monthly basis and 
therefore have a similar character to contributions for the public pension system (GRV), which 
might lead households to the thinking not to include the contributions into savings, but to view 
them as some sort of tax. 
When considering wealth data, one should keep in mind how they were asked in the surveys. 
SAVE is, as most general-purpose surveys, not diary-based, but collects recall information. 
Values are thus much more due to response error. When looking at the wealth information 
closely, one can see that in 8 cases, wealth at the beginning and the end of last year differ by 
the factor 10, 100, 1000 and 10,000 (ex.: wealth at the beginning of the year = 12,000 €, wealth 
at the end of last year: 12 €), so it must presumed that households think of the same value in 
both cases but the observed value is wrong by one of the four errors mentioned above. These 
eight values have been corrected accordingly.
15 
Contributions to life insurances approximately calculated by the difference in life insurance 
wealth at the end and the beginning of the year. If numbers were correct, the difference includes 
the internal rate of return as well as the reduction of the cash-in penalty. One has to take 
account of the possibility that wealth was removed in that period (negative contributions), and 
further that this difference, recalculated for a monthly basis, does not exceed a certain income 
share. If this would be the case, then this wealth difference might only be realized by the real-
location of wealth and not by savings from current disposable income. This share of income 
which is to be assumed with 1/3, which is less than the assumed share for credit repayments 
with 1/2 since the contributions would take place on a regular basis. High debit interest rates 
                                                       
14 Own calculations.   11
might force higher repayment rates which is the reason to allow for higher shares. 
3.2.3  Old-age provision 
Occupational pension schemes In 2001, the SAVE questionnaire included the financial 
wealth category "Other contractually defined private old-age provision, e.g. special old-age 
provision assets or private pension policies". After 2001, this question was split up into three 
separate questions: (1) occupational pension schemes
16; (2) fiscally subsidized private old-age 
provisions ('Riester-Rente')
17 and (3) other contractual private old-age provisions
18. Along with 
the split, the design was slightly changed. Individuals are not only asked for the pension wealth 
at the beginning and the end of each year, but also for employer and employee (own) contribu-
tions separately for each pension scheme. 
If the three sub-items for private pensions are aggregated in 2003 and 2001 and compared to 
the year 2001, the following results can be seen. 
Table 4: Private old-age provision: ownership changes 
TPI 2001    TPI 2004  CAPI 2001     CAPI 2003    RR 2003        all 
Ownership rates                               19.40%        24.40%  11.70%           26.60%         20.20%      19.10% 
Panel comparison                                        <—> < — >  
only in 2001 / withdrawal                          4.10%  11.90% 
neither in 2001 nor in 2003/2004             65.60%  63.70% 
in both 2001 and 2003 / 2004                   13.40%  8.50% 
only in 2003/2004 / new contr.                16.90%  15.90% 
 
Source: All SAVE subsamples. 
Note: Weighted values. 
 
The results from Table 4 can be divided into the three pension schemes, which is presented 
in Table 5. 
When we only look at fully dependently employed, the ownership rates of occupation pen-
sion schemes rises to 20.4%. This is less than half the values Kortmann (2003) finds (44% for 
men and 39% for women) using data from private and public employers, pension fonds and 
                                                                                                                                                                                
15 This procedure was done accordingly for all components of financial wealth. In SAVE , financial wealth consists of 
six categories in 2001; in 2003, private old-age provisions was asked in a more detailed manner, which raises 
the number of financial wealth categories to eight. If only one value was available for the beginning or the 
end of the last year due to refusal, the missing value was replaced by the observed one thereby assuming no 
wealth difference. 
16 This comprises defined pension plans, pension fonds and 'Direktzusagen'. 
17 E.g. 'staatlich geförderte und zertifizierte Sparanlagen, die nicht vor Ruhestandseintritt auflösbar sind.' 
18 Which in Germany is: 'Altersvorsorge-Sondervermögen oder private Rentenversicherungsverträge, die nicht staatlich 
gefördert werden bzw. abgeschlossen wurden, bevor es solche Fördermöglichkeiten gab'.   12
'Pensionskassen', and all administrators of private pension schemes in the public service
19 
Table 5: Ownership rates of different old-age provisions 
   CAPI 2003  RR 2003  TPI 2004  all 
Occupational pensions  13.3%  11.2%  14.1%  12.0% 
Fiscally subsidized old-age provisions  5.8%  4.7%  5.9%  5.1% 
Other old-age provisions  13.2%  7.6%  9.8%  8.9% 
conditional on full employment
a      
Occupational pensions  19.5%  17.5%  20.4%  18.4% 
Fiscally subsidized old-age provisions  7.6%  7.9%  9.2%  8.1% 
Other old-age provisions  19.0%  13.3%  14.7%  14.5% 
a For couples: if male partner is fully employed.  
Source: All SAVE 2003 and 2004 subsamples. 
Note: Weighted values. 
 
Following the arguments from the last section, one should also consider to impute private 
old-age pensions and add the contributions to savings. There are two problems associated 
with that procedure. First, nonresponse is very high.
20 This clearly is the consequence of the 
problems immanent in the complexity of this topic. Employee and especially employer contri-
butions for occupational pension schemes are certainly less well known than own contributions 
to other private pension schemes or life insurances. Second, answers are frequently inconsis-
tent: the difference of stocks equals the contributions in many cases, but the question asked 
for monthly contributions. It can be assumed that respondents gave a crude approximation for 
the pension stocks, and took the year's differences as contribution measures. These values have 
been divided by 12, accordingly. Still, the refusal level is an issue; a correction of savings by 
these contributions is associated with a high loss of observations. An alternative would be an 
imputation of contributions, measured as certain percentage of net income for households, who 
own the respective private pension category. The contributions to occupational pensions rela-
tive to net income are measured as 3.1%/3.0% (mean/median; weighted values) for the SAVE 
2003 and 2004 data; N=372, after imputation. 
Unfortunately, there is no possibility to check these numbers by an external data source; the 
EVS represents in this respect no outside data source, and numbers for occupational pension 
scheme contributions have never been estimated relative to net income. The best differentiated 
data source for occupational pensions so far is Kortmann (2003). 
Fiscally subsidized private pension schemes The contribution rates for 'Riester'-
pensions can be imputed relatively easy: the so-called 'Riester'-stairs gives an lower and up-
                                                       
19 'Träger öffentlicher Zusatzversorgungsleistungen. 
20 Conditional nonresponse is at over 70% for stocks and 66% for contributions for occupational pensions. For the other 
two private pension schemes, values are comparable.   13
per bound for private contributions. In 2002, 1% of last year's gross income are the necessary 
investment to receive full fiscal subsidies. It rises gradually rises to 4% in 2008. Own contribu-
tions and subsidies accrue the pension plan. The full regulation is shown in Table 6. 
Table 6: Minimum and maximum contribution rates to 'Riester' saving plans 
 
Investment year  Minimum contribution rate  Maximum contribution for 
  in % of gross income  fiscal subsidies 
2002 and 2003  1%  525 €   
2004 and 2005  2%  1,050 €  reduced by basic 
2006 and 2007  3%  1,575 €  and child allowances 
2008 and later  4%  2,100 €   
Note: In principal, lower contributions than the minimum are possible, but subsidies will reduce accord-
ingly and thereby the incentives. 
 
For the current contracts, the following steps were made: (1) 'Riester'-contributions refer 
to gross income, but SAVE only collects net income. The ratio of gross to net income for the 
average income earner was 64%, which was taken as a proxy for all households. Contributions 
therefore have to be multiplied by the inverse value of about 1.6. (2) Maximum contributions 
are given by the values shown in Table 6. (3) For SAVE , the years relevant to impute current 
contributions are the years 2003 and 2004, only. 
If one is interested in projecting values over the life cycle, minimum contribution rates have 
to be calculated as weighted averages of the numbers in Table 6 with the weights being the 
years to retirement: the younger and thereby the longer retirement age lies ahead, the higher 
is the weight for the 4% value for calculating average contribution rate. Example: minimum con-
tributions are 3.5% for a today 40-year-old entering retirement at age 65, 3.2% for a 50 year old, 
2.0% for a 55-year-old, and 2% for a 60 year old. 
Other private old-age provisions Like for the situation of occupational pension 
schemes, external data sources are limited, which requires to take another look at the data in 
SAVE. 281 respondents claimed to own private pensions in 2003 and 2004. In the data for 
stocks and contributions, we only observe 21 cases containing full information. The procedure 
is comparable to dealing with occupational pensions. 
 
1.  For all observations which include stocks as well as contributions: If contributions equal 
the difference of year's end and year's beginning, they were in sum (employer and em-
ployee's contributions) or, if only one is available, separately divided by 12 since monthly   14
contributions were mixed up with annual contributions. 
2.  If either employer or employee's contributions were refused, the other value was not 
imputed since I assumed that other private contributions were made without employers' 
contributions (unlike for occupational pensions). 
3.  After that, contributions were compared to net income. If that share was higher than 
20%
21, the contributions were calculated as the difference between the two stock values, 
divided by 12. 
4.  In the next control stage, the mean of the corrected shares was calculated conditional for 
shares being smaller than 30% of net income; this conditional mean was used to impute 
the missing contributions relative to the net income. 
5. Contributions being larger than 30% were replaced by the conditional mean share as 
well. In total, the mean contribution share (of all original and imputed values) is at 5.2% 
of net income. 
3.3  Imputed rent 
If comparing the wealth situation at old age, it seems advisable to take the housing wealth 
into account since this typically represents the household's largest wealth asset. This can be 
done in two ways. First, one could treat housing wealth as if it was paid out as an annuity over 
the rest of the life cycle. The second alternative is to use the imputed rent of the owner-occupied 
housing. This construct compares the housing wealth to comparable market rent payments a 
household had to pay if he would sell the house and rent a similar object. 
Estimates for the imputed rent relative to the worth of the concerning housing are about 
3.9% p.a. (median) and 4.7% (mean) based on weighted values in the EVS 1998. These values 
are slightly below those of the Ring Deutscher Makler (RDM).
22 
Comparing values from the EVS and the RDM, I presume a value of 5% p.a., or 0.42% per 
month. 
The difference of the imputed rent and the annuity method lies in the time horizon. While 
it is infinite for the first one, the second one depends on the duration of the annuity payments 
                                                       
21 This is assumed a lower share than for life insurances and credit repayments since the regular contributions to old-age 
provisions are typically not a high share of monthly net income. 
22 Values are shown separated for houses/flats which were built before/after 1940. The RDM publishes these numbers for 
256 cities and regions. In Eastern Germany, these values are much higher than in Western Germany. This means that in 
the Eastern part, purchase prices for houses are much lower. Munich, for example, shows very low imputed rent values 
which can be translated in the belief that housing worth will not significantly deteriorate and can collect rent payments 
for a long time horizon, or otherwise, the market is assumed to be less volatile.   15
which is in the case at hand given by the year of death. A simple example would make this 
clear. Assume a house worth 500,000 e. If it was sold and the sum annuitized for a monthly 
rent payment with the duration given by the difference of life expectancy minus the retirement 
entry age, which is assumed to, say, 30 years, it would pay a rent of 2,071.21 € per month if 
real interest rate was 2.8% percent p.a. The same housing wealth assumed as monthly imputed 
rent would then be 2083.33 e, nearly exactly the same amount. Of course, this comparison 
is highly age-dependent: A shorter life expectancy clearly would raise the annuity, while the 
imputed rent delivers the higher value for later years of death.
23 
There is another way to retrieve an additional income flow from home ownership: reverse 
annuity mortgages. The reverse mortgage pays a regular income, and typically is available re-
gardless of current income. The amount one can borrow depends on age, the current interest 
rate, other loan fees, and the appraised value of the home. Generally, the more valuable the 
home is, the older one is, the lower the interest, the more one can borrow. No payments are 
needed, because the loan is not due as long as the house is one's principal residence. The loan 
is repaid when the occupation of the home ceases (by death, or by selling the home). 
4  Computing savings and saving rates 
After the discussed steps of calculating different possibly unconsidered monthly savings, the 
question arises: what kind of difference does it make? Does it only affect households who have 
rather high monthly savings anyway, or does this also significantly change the picture of sav-
ings we get for poorer households? I will also quickly mention the results for the other two sav-
ings measures in SAVE (difference in financial wealth and residual meausue). 
4.1  Corrected one-off savings measure 
The effects of four different saving measures are shown in Figures 4 and 5. Differences be-
tween net and gross savings
24 are 1.4%/0.2% (mean/median), N=2391. The means and me-
dian values are summarized in Table 7. 
Table 7: Saving rates with different savings components 
 
  Gross saving rates  Net saving rates  Net + LIC
a    Net + LI + POAC
b 
Mean  9.4%  10.8%  11.4%  12.3% 
Median  3.5%  3.7%  4.2%  5.1% 
Standard error  23.7%  30.7%  31.1%  31.5% 
                                                       
23 Assuming that the annuity depends on individual subjective life expectancies and not on standardized life tables. 
24 Gross savings are defined as the values retrieved from the one-shot savings question, while net savings are gross sav-
ings plus credit repayments.   16
Share of HH with 0 savings  43.1%  42.6%  40.4%  35.6% 
a LIC = Contributions to whole life insurances. 
b POAC = Contributions to private old-age pension schemes. 
Source: SAVE 2003 and 2004. 
Notes: Weighted values. N=2391 —> only values if all measures were observed for each observation. 
The official statistics of the German Federal Reserve bank show values of an average of 10.8% for 
saving rates in 2003. 
 
The results of Table 7 make one point very clear. Adding different contributions, debt re-
payments etc. to gross savings does not change much for households which do not save at all. 
The share of non-savers goes down from a high rate of 43% to 35% after adding five flow meas-
ures (credit repayments, contributions to life insurances, occupational, fiscally subsidized and 
other private old-age provisions). This means that the inequality of the savings distributions will 
not decrease but rather increase after correcting the one-shot savings question. The largest drop 
in non-saver rates is achieved when accounting for all private old-age provision types which is an 
additional hint that respondents might systematically ignore certain saving components which 
require contributions on a regular basis. 
The results from Table 7, though, must be seen in the light that the one-shot savings 
question probably suffers heavily from underreporting. A similar analysis for the one-shot total 
non-durable expenditure question can be found in Essig (2005b). But unlike response rates for 
the expenditure question, direct and indirect refusals for the savings question are much more 
frequent. So in addition to the probably underreported values itself, there is an information loss 
due to these refusals, as well as through the type-I error in the filtering process. In addition, 
many of the zero values might well be no true zeros, as shown in Section 3. 
4.2  Other savings measures 
Calculating saving rates from first differences in financial wealth shows values of 5.2 
(mean/median) with 2123 observations for SAVE 2003 and 2004 with 8.2% observations being 
below zero, and 52% being exactly zero, which supports the previous findings that respondents 
tend to repeat values (year's beginning values for year's end). 
The residual measure of savings, no matter whether the one-shot or the imputed non-
durable expenditure measure is used for the computation, proves to be extremely noisy. As is 
shown by Essig (2005b), about one fourth of the imputed non-durable values are higher than 
net income. The mean/median saving rates are 22%/33% 
25; using the one-shot expenditure val-
ues, saving rates rise to 49%/60%. Values reach implausible values, e.g. the one-shot expendi-
ture question takes on values up to 17 times the corresponding monthly income. The question 
                                                       
25 If income is not used in the estimation and imputation step, saving rates are 12.0%/28%; cf. Essig (2005b).   17
explicitly only asked for normal non-durable expenditures, supported by show cards. 
Computing savings by any of these two means seems little promising. Stocks of financial 
wealth are very often the same for the beginning and the end of the year, or implausibly remote. 
Non-durable expenditure values are also problematic. Even though the imputed values do a 
slightly better job, they entail other problems, cf. Essig (2004). 
5  Conclusions 
This paper shows potential flaws of and limited possibilities to correct a one-shot saving 
question. Any measure to 'correct' the values given by the respondents is associated with rather 
untestable hypotheses. Hints are shown that respondents indeed do not include contributions 
to whole life insurances. For that reasons, the one-shot measures are corrected for credit repay-
ments (=net savings), contributions to whole life insurance, and to old-age pension schemes. 
Mean values rise from 9.4% from the original one-shot question values to 11 .4% when including 
credit repayments and imputed contributions to life insurances, and to 1 2.3% when additionally 
including contributions to all three types of private old-age provision. It is unclear, though, 
which of these items is already part of the values and are therefore accounted for twice. The 
share of non-savers, in contrast, does not change remarkably when including credit repayments 
and contributions to life insurances; the drop is larger when adding contributions to private 
old-age provisions.   18
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Separated or divorced (D)
Female (D)
East Germany (D)
Ownership: saving accounts (D)
Ownership: build. soc. contr. (D)
Ownership: whole life ins. (D)
Ownership: priv. old-age prov. (D)
Onwership: Stocks, Fonds (D)
Credit repayments (D)
 
Source: All SAVE subsamples. 
Notes: Dependent variable takes on the value 1 if respondent answered not being able / willing to save and 0 
otherwise (one of the first three categories of filter question). Only significant coefficients displayed. In-
come and age not displayed: negative influence up to 23.000 €/months and up to age 57 years. Columns 
show the marginal effect of a change from 0 to 1. Ex.: Owners of saving accounts have 21% lower probabil-
ity not being able to save. The brighter the figure, the higher the probability for savings capability.   20













Ownership: saving accounts (D)
Ownership: whole life ins. (D)
Ownership: bonds (D)
Save: reg. fixed amount (D)
Save: occasionally (D)




Source: All SAVE subsamples. 
Notes: Conditional estimation for respondents who save according to the filter question. Dependent vari-
able takes on the value 1 if respondent answered having nothing saved in the previous calender year or even 
dipped into savings. Only significant dummy variables displayed. Income is negative significant up to 
19.500 €. Columns represent hight of marginal effects from a change from zero to one of the independent 
variables. Ex: saving accounts owners have a 16% lower chance of having zero or negative savings in the 
previous year. or even dipped into savings. The brighter the figure, the higher the probability for positive 
saving values.  
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<30 >=30-<40 >=40-<50 >=50-<60 >=60
Gross savings Net savings
Net sav. + LI Net sav.+LI+POA
 
 
Source: SAVE 2003 and 2004. 
Notes: Weighted values. Only observations shown if no variable is missing. LI = Contrib. to whole life 
insurances; POA = Contrib. to priv. old-age pension schemes. 
 


























<30 >=30-<40 >=40-<50 >=50-<60 >=60
Gross savings Net savings
Net sav. + LI Net sav.+LI+POA
 
Source: SAVE 2003 and 2004. 
Notes: Weighted values. Median values for households < 30 years are zero. Only observations 
shown if no variable is missing. LI = Contrib. to whole life insurances; POA = Contrib. to priv. old-age 
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